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Abstract
Policy specification for personal user data is a hard prob-
lem, as it depends on many factors that cannot be pre-
determined by system developers. Simultaneously, sys-
tems are increasingly relying on users to make security
decisions. In this paper, we propose the approach of
Policy by Example (PyBE) for specifying user-specific
security policies. PyBE brings the benefits of the suc-
cessful approach of programming by example (PBE) for
program synthesis to the policy specification domain. In
PyBE, users provide policy examples that specify if ac-
tions should be allowed or denied in certain scenarios.
PyBE then predicts policy decisions for new scenarios.
A key aspect of PyBE is its use of active learning to en-
able users to correct potential errors in their policy spec-
ification. To evaluate PyBE’s effectiveness, we perform
a feasibility study with expert users. Our study demon-
strates that PyBE correctly predicts policies with 76%
accuracy across all users, a significant improvement over
naive approaches. Finally, we investigate the causes of
inaccurate predictions to motivate directions for future
research in this promising new domain.
1 Introduction
In the era of pervasive computing, the security of user
data and resources is of paramount importance. Com-
plex systems such as IoT platforms (e.g., IFTTT [51] and
SmartThings [41]), smartphone platforms (e.g., Android
and iOS) and even traditional commodity platforms are
being leveraged for processing user data. However, our
knowledge of policy specification has not kept pace with
the rise of complex systems that are increasingly relying
on the user to specify the security policy.
Further, user data has become increasingly user-
specific. Users no longer directly deal with generic files,
but create specific data objects such as notes, whiteboard
∗This author was a student at the North Carolina State University at
the time this work was completed.
snapshots, and selfies. This data is abstract, i.e., its im-
portance and properties are subjective. System designers
or application developers cannot specify a security pol-
icy for abstract user data. The situation is even critical for
novel security systems that provide strong data security
guarantees for user data (e.g., decentralized information
flow control (DIFC) systems for Android [19,32,33,54],
Chromium [5]). Such systems are impractical to deploy
unless users specify security policies; and users are bad
at specifying security policies [29,40] without assistance.
This paper raises the simple but important question of
policy specification: how to teach the system what the
user wants to protect, and how the user wants to protect
it? Consider the following example: a smartphone user
wants to synchronize all personal notes with her cloud
account, except notes labeled as medical data. Since we
are dealing with user-specific data-use scenarios, we can
justifiably expect the user to provide some input to the
system. However, expecting the user to enumerate every
possible scenario involving medical data is impractical.
The policy must be predicted.
We propose the approach of specifying Policy by Ex-
ample (PyBE) for user-specific data. PyBE is inspired
by the successful use of programming by example (PBE)
for program synthesis. Specifically, we emulate the ap-
proach of Gulwani [14], where the user specifies exam-
ples consisting of the input and output, and the system
learns a program that can predict the output for unknown
(but similar) inputs. Similarly, in PyBE, the user spec-
ifies policy examples, in terms of the data-use scenario
(i.e., the input) and the policy decision (i.e., the output).
The system uses the policy examples to predict policy
decisions for new scenarios. By requiring only relevant
examples, and not complete policy specification, PyBE
makes policy specification tractable.
Predicting security policies for abstract, user-specific
data with unknown properties is hard, as the learner can-
not make any assumptions about the input data points.
In contrast, prior work on predicting privacy policies
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for well-known private data [8, 23] can make assump-
tions that aid prediction; e.g., Cranshaw et al. [8] take
advantage of probabilistic models to learn location pri-
vacy policies knowing that location and time are continu-
ous variables. PyBE cannot make any such assumptions,
which puts us at a significant disadvantage. However,
this disadvantage drove us to embrace a simpler approach
that does not demand specific properties from data.
We chose a variant of the k nearest neighbor (kNN)
classifier [31] for predicting policies. Our key require-
ments were that the algorithm be (1) non-parametric, i.e.,
independent of models that rely on fixed set of parame-
ters, and (2) easy to explain, i.e., for the user to under-
stand how the policy was inferred. Recall that a policy
example is composed of a scenario and the correspond-
ing policy decision. To predict the policy decision for
a new scenario, our algorithm performs a nearest neigh-
bor search for finding similar scenarios from the user’s
examples, and predicts the majority policy decision.
An important challenge in applying kNN is calculating
the distance between data points. To calculate distance
between scenarios, we treat scenarios as Boolean func-
tions, and propose a novel distance metric for the same.
As some policies may be relatively more important to the
user, we extend our metric to support weights. Note that
existing distance metrics (e.g., jaccard distance) may re-
quire significant re-engineering to incorporate weights,
which motivates our development of a new metric.
PyBE recognizes that policy specification by users in
any form is error prone. A key contribution is our use
of active learning for enabling the user to correct policy
decisions. We draw inspiration from the work of Gul-
wani [14], which detects noise in the user’s examples,
and prompts the user for new outputs for problematic ex-
amples. Similarly, PyBE uses noise in the user’s policy
examples as an indication of error in policy decisions,
and engage the user in correcting errors.
We evaluate the feasibility of PyBE with a study of
expert users. Our study involves 8 participants, and 5
target security policies (e.g., exporting to the enterprise
cloud), i.e., we solve 40 independent policy specification
problems. Our participants generate 246 policy scenarios
in total, and assign decisions for the 5 policies, resulting
in a total of 1,230 policy examples across participants.
We perform two experiments with this data. First, we
find errors in policy decisions using a manual review and
a PyBE-assisted interactive review of policy examples.
Then, we test PyBE’s prediction for randomly generated
scenarios with unknown policy decisions. PyBE demon-
strates a prediction accuracy of over 76% across all par-
ticipants, and fares better than our assumed baseline of
a random coin flip, and a naive approach. A significant
finding is that the PyBE-assisted interactive review ap-
proach helped participants find five times as many errors
as their manual reviews.
Our evaluation is evidence of the feasibility, i.e., the
effectiveness of PyBE in terms of both prediction accu-
racy and error identification, but does not speak to the
general usability of PyBE. Although 8 participants is
small for a human study, the evaluation is able to an-
swer important questions through the analysis of user-
generated policy examples (i.e., 1,230 user-generated ex-
amples). The research questions answered in the evalua-
tion operate at the level of policy examples, making the
dataset sufficiently large for evaluating feasibility.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We introduce the Policy by Example (PyBE)
paradigm for predicting user-specific security poli-
cies. Our approach takes labeled policy scenarios
from the user, and predicts policy decisions for new
policy scenarios.
• We use an interactive approach to assist users in
finding incorrect policy decisions in their examples.
We empirically demonstrate its effectiveness over
manual policy reviews.
• We perform a feasibility study with expert users,
and demonstrate better prediction accuracy than
both a baseline as well as a naive approach.
This paper is the first step in our vision of a policy as-
sistant for user data. With PyBE, we provide an approach
for predicting security policies for user-specific data, and
demonstrate its technical feasibility. Further, we analyze
our incorrect predictions, and describe the lessons we
learned in the process. Finally, we describe challenges
(e.g., usability for non-experts, modeling policy change)
and future research directions in this promising new area.
2 Related Work
The notion of Policy by Example (PyBE) is inspired by
recent work in the domain of Programming by Exam-
ple (PBE). The objective of PBE is simple: if the user
knows the steps for performing a task, the user should not
have to write a program; instead, the computer should
learn from the user’s actions on an example, and gen-
eralize the program [9, 26]. However, the user may not
always be able to express the reasoning, or the intermedi-
ate steps, involved in creating a program. Recent work by
Gulwani [14] makes PBE feasible for such programming
tasks, by using only input-output examples to synthesize
a program that predicts outputs for unseen inputs. PyBE
follows a similar intuition, and predicts policy decisions
for new scenarios using only input-output examples (i.e.,
policy scenarios and corresponding decisions).
However, PyBE does not generalize the program be-
fore testing, as is often done in PBE. That is, while
the proposed paradigm is conceptually similar to PBE,
2
the process used to predict policies borrows from an-
other well-established domain: case-based reasoning
(CBR) [25]. In CBR, the outcome of a test case is deter-
mined by looking at the outcomes of previously observed
cases (e.g., legal reasoning using precedents). In a way,
CBR mimics a human expert’s reasoning, and performs
lazy generalization of domain knowledge at testing time.
CBR has been successfully used in many domains, e.g.,
synthesizing music [1, 2], providing decision support in
molecular biology [22], and for solving spatial reasoning
problems [17]. However, to our knowledge, CBR has
never been used for predicting user security policies, and
PyBE is novel in its use of a similarity heuristic (i.e., a
form of CBR) for predicting security policies.
A critical advantage of CBR is that it provides a way to
deal with uncertainty, in contrast with the process of ea-
ger learning (e.g., rule induction). Prior user-controllable
methods for predicting privacy policies for well-known
private data (e.g., Location) use eager learning, which
requires making strategic parameter choices for gener-
alization, often based on some known properties of the
training data [8,12,23]. For example, Cranshaw et al. [8]
use a probabilistic model to learn location privacy poli-
cies, assuming the availability of a large number of data
points since location is a continuous variable. However,
PyBE cannot make such assumptions for user data with
uncertain properties (e.g., Bob’s scanned documents, Al-
ice’s notes), and uses a form of CBR, which does not
require a priori generalization.
Prior work has proposed usable interfaces for elicit-
ing security responses, which are relevant for our long-
term vision of creating a policy assistant for user data.
For instance, a prototype of PyBE for a computing de-
vice may adopt the “interactive dropdowns” in Johnson
et al.’s interactive policy authoring template for speci-
fying initial examples [20, 21]. Similarly, Reeder et al’s
“expandable grids” may be adapted for visualizing policy
examples for the user [37]. Such work only provides in-
terfaces, and does not fulfill PyBE’s objective of making
policy specification feasible through prediction. Further,
recent work on user-driven access control (e.g., Roesner
et al. [39], Ringer et al. [38]) provides a usable way of ac-
quiring the user’s policy decision, by embedding access
permissions into the user’s natural UI flow of accessing
resources. However, defining specific permissions (i.e.,
gadgets) for an exponential space of subjective and user-
specific data-use scenarios may be infeasible.
Prior work also complements the specification of user-
specific policies, by providing content recognition for au-
tomatically tagging data for PyBE [6, 44, 48, 49, 52], or
by providing security profiles for standard, well-known,
security settings (e.g., Android permissions) [27, 28], al-
lowing PyBE to focus on predicting policies for abstract,
user-specific data.
Finally, while PyBE assists the user in specifying poli-
cies for user-specific data, there has been prior research
in the domain of policy specification to help applica-
tion or system developers. Prior work provides appli-
cation developers with tools for expressing their security
policies [10, 15, 16, 45]. Further, in contrast with prior
work that assists developers in expressing known poli-
cies, Slankas et al. aid the developer by extracting access
control rules from application-specific text artifacts using
natural language processing (NLP) [45]. Similarly, ac-
cess control logs and system call traces have previously
been used to refine the system’s security policies (e.g.,
EASEAndroid [53] and Polgen [47]).
3 Motivation and Problem
User data and data-use scenarios are user-specific. Ex-
ternal observers such as system designers or application
developers cannot specify the user’s security policy with-
out knowing the user’s context of data use [4,34]. More-
over, this constraint is not limited to user-owned data;
prior work demonstrates that even the security prefer-
ences for enterprise data vary with users and personal
data-use contexts [13]. Consider the following example,
which describes how two users may differ in terms of the
relevance of data-use scenarios as well as security pref-
erences for the same scenarios.
Example: Alice and Bob are two smartphone users, who
use a fictional note-taking application Notes (similar to
Google Keep) on their smartphones to collect and orga-
nize information. Notes backs up data to a designated
cloud provider (e.g., Google Drive). Alice consolidates
expenses by scanning paper receipts into the Notes ap-
plication. However, Alice does not trust the cloud with
medical data, and wants medical receipts (i.e., receipts
scanned at the hospital) to only be stored locally, and not
synced. Similarly, Bob uses Notes to aggregate his doc-
uments. As Notes is set up with Bob’s enterprise cloud,
he does not wish to sync personal documents (e.g., doc-
uments created after work hours). That is, the require-
ments for what users want to protect (i.e., relevant data-
use scenarios) are user-specific.
Further, even when two users may agree on what they
want to protect, they may not agree on how they want to
protect it. Suppose Alice and Bob meet at a conference
and exchange business cards. Alice is self-employed,
and feels confident in backing up business cards acquired
after work hours to her enterprise cloud. However, Bob
does not want to disclose networking opportunities to his
company by syncing cards collected after work hours to
his enterprise cloud. Security preferences for user data
stem from the user’s personal circumstances.
Problem: In this paper, we focus on the problem of spec-
ifying user-specific security policies. The nature of the
problem dictates that the policy specification must re-
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(a) The user specifies ex-
amples. PyBE suggests
error-correction.
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(b) PyBE predicts policy deci-
sions for new scenarios.
Figure 1: An overview of the PyBE approach.
Table 1: Bob’s examples for the WorkCloud policy.
No. Scenario Policy Decision
1 {Home, Photo} deny
2 {Work, Photo} allow
3 {Document} allow
ceive input from the user. However, it is impractical to
expect the user to specify the policy for every scenario
in an exponential space. Hence, this paper addresses
the problem of predicting the security policy for new
data-use scenarios, based on the scenarios previously de-
scribed by the user.
4 Policy by Example (PyBE)
PyBE is inspired by recent work on Programming by Ex-
amples [14], which learns a program from input-output
examples. As shown in Figure 1a, the user provides pol-
icy examples (i.e., data-use scenarios and policy deci-
sions), and PyBE interactively suggests corrections to the
user’s policy decisions. PyBE then predicts policy deci-
sions for new scenarios as shown in Figure 1b.
This section provides the intuition behind our ap-
proach. We describe PyBE formally in Section 5. We
start by describing the structure of a policy example.
4.1 The Policy Example
A policy example is composed of a scenario, and a pol-
icy decision (i.e., allow/1 or deny/0) for that scenario. A
scenario is as a set of tags, where each tag denotes the re-
source to be protected (e.g., business card) or a condition
that influences the policy (e.g., created after work hours).
Using a set of tags enables users to describe complex sce-
narios composed multiple conditions or data objects. Our
use of tags is motivated by prior work that demonstrates
that users can effectively re-purpose organizational tags
to express access control policies [24].
In addition to the user-customizable policy example,
we also define a fixed policy target which represents the
action controlled by the policy; e.g., exporting data to the
enterprise cloud, i.e., the WorkCloud policy target. Pol-
icy specification is performed separately for each policy
target, i.e., independent of other targets. Thus, each tar-
get represents a separate high-level policy that must be
specified (e.g., the user’s WorkCloud policy). The policy
targets used in this paper are motivated by prior work on
restricting the network export of secret data [5, 32, 50].
Table 1 shows Bob’s policy examples for the Work-
Cloud policy target. We describe each example, along
with Bob’s security requirement behind it. First, Bob
considers data created at home to be personal, so Bob’s
photos created at home must never be exported to the en-
terprise cloud. Thus, Bob denies export for example 1,
i.e, {Home,Photos}. Second, photos taken at work
may be exported to the enterprise cloud. Hence, Bob
allows export for example 2, i.e., {Work,Photos}.
Third, Bob does not (currently) imagine a situation
where he would deny export for documents. Hence, Bob
allows export for example 3, i.e., {Document}. We use
Bob’s examples to describe PyBE.
4.2 Our Approach
As described previously, PyBE uses a variation of the
kNN algorithm for predicting policies. That is, Bob pro-
vides PyBE with a set of policy examples (i.e., scenarios
labeled with policy decisions). When faced with a new
scenario with an unknown policy decision, we perform a
nearest neighbor search of Bob’s examples. That is, we
search Bob’s examples for the closest examples, i.e., ex-
amples with scenarios closest to the new scenario, and
predict the policy decision of the majority of the clos-
est examples. Note that distance between examples is
described in terms of their scenarios (i.e., when we say
“examples are close”, it means their scenarios are close).
An approach for predicting security policies should be
deterministic if we want users to understand its outcome
(i.e., independent of arbitrary parameters). Based on this
rationale, we eliminate the need to specify the parame-
ter k. Our variation of kNN considers the closest neigh-
bors as all neighbors at the closest distance, instead of k
neighbors at varying distances.
We now demonstrate our approach with a manual
walk-through. A manual walk-through is feasible be-
cause the basic process of kNN is intuitive and its out-
come is easy to explain. To demonstrate our approach,
we predict policy decisions for the following new sce-
narios for Bob: {Home} and {Home,Document}, us-
ing Bob’s initial policy specification shown in Table 1.
Consider the first new scenario, {Home}. Just by look-
ing at Bob’s specification in Table 1, the reader may
identify example 1 (i.e., {Home,Photo}) as closest to
the new scenario, since it is the only example that in-
cludes the tag Home. As a result, we predict the pol-
icy decision for the new scenario {Home} as deny, i.e.,
as the decision of its nearest neighbor {Home,Photo}.
This decision mirrors Bob’s assumption of data created
at home being personal, and not exportable to the enter-
prise cloud. PyBE’s distance metric described in Sec-
tion 5 uses a similar property for computing distance be-
tween two examples, and comes to the same conclusion.
Now consider the second new scenario,
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Table 2: Bob’s extended set of examples for the Work-
Cloud policy target, with newly added examples in bold.
No. Scenario Policy Decision
1 {Home, Photo} deny
2 {Work, Photo} allow
3 {Document} allow
4 {Home, Document} deny
5 {Home, Memo} allow
{Home,Document}. This time, there are two examples
that seem to be equally close to the new scenario, i.e.,
{Home,Photo} and {Document}, since they each
have one tag in common with {Home,Document}.
Since both the nearest examples have different policy
decisions, our simple metric is insufficient. This is one
of the motivations for introducing weights. Suppose
Bob considers personal data created at home (i.e.,
the tag Home) to be most confidential. Therefore,
Bob assigns Home more “importance” (i.e., a higher
weight) than any other tag in terms of its influence
on the policy decision. As a result, the new sce-
nario {Home,Document} can be deemed closer to
{Home,Photo} than {Document}, as Home has a
higher weight and more say in the decision than the
other tags, e.g., Document. Thus, export is denied
for {Home,Document}, which aligns with Bob’s
preference of data created at home being personal, and
not exportable to the enterprise cloud.
The purpose of weights is not limited to break-
ing ties. Suppose Bob specifies another exam-
ple, i.e., {Document,Receipt}, with deci-
sion allow. Now consider another new sce-
nario {Document,Receipt,Home}. Without
any knowledge of weights, it is easy to see that
{Document,Receipt} would be the example closest
to the new scenario {Document,Receipt,Home},
resulting in allow being predicted (i.e., there is no
tie). At the same time, we know that Bob has allo-
cated a higher weight to Home, since Bob considers
home data to be confidential and important with re-
spect to the WorkCloud target. The weights ensure
that {Document,Receipt,Home} is closer to
{Home,Photo} instead of {Document,Receipt},
and export is denied as per Bob’s actual security pref-
erence. Simply stated, weights enable the user to make
some information tags beat others in the distance cal-
culation. Our weighted metric described in Section 5.2
follows a similar rationale.
An important contribution of PyBE is that it recog-
nizes that policy specification by users can be error-
prone. PyBE uses active learning to engage the user in
finding and correcting potential errors in their policy de-
cisions. Our approach is inspired by the work of Gul-
wani [14], which detects noise in the user’s input-output
examples, and recommends changes to incorrect outputs.
{Home, Memo}
{Home, Document} {Home, Photo}
denydeny
allow
Figure 2: {Home,Memo} disagrees with the majority
policy decision of its nearest neighbors.
{Home, Photo}
{Home, Memo} {Home, Document}
denyallow
deny
Figure 3: There is no majority policy decision among the
nearest neighbors of {Home,Photo}.
Similarly, PyBE looks for noise in the user’s examples,
which may indicate one or more incorrect policy deci-
sions. We use our variant of kNN for this purpose. Note
that the objective of this task is to engage the user in find-
ing errors in existing examples, and not to predict policy
decisions for new examples. We explain our approach
with the following extension to Bob’s policy:
Suppose Bob adds two additional examples, i.e.,
{Home,Document} with decision deny, and
{Home,Memo} with decision allow. We borrow
the first example ({Home,Document}) from the previ-
ous discussion on weights. The second example shows
Bob’s policy for a memo created at home. Further,
recall that Home has a higher weight, hence examples
containing Home will be closer to each other than other
examples not containing Home. Bob’s complete set of
examples is shown in Table 2.
We perform a nearest neighbor search for the exam-
ple {Home,Memo}, and identify {Home,Photo} and
{Home,Document} as its nearest neighbors. An intu-
itive way of visualizing this group of examples is in the
form of a graph, such that (1) the examples are vertices,
and (2) directed edges are drawn from the example for
whom the search was performed to its nearest neighbors.
Figure 2 shows the graph for {Home, Memo}.
If we focus on the policy decisions of the vertices
in Figure 2, we see that Bob’s decision for {Home,
Memo} (i.e., allow) disagrees with the decision for both
its nearest neighbors. This inconsistency or noise indi-
cates one of two possibilities: (a) Bob made a mistake
in labeling {Home, Memo} with the decision allow, or
(b) Bob wanted to make a genuine exception for memos.
Instead of making a guess, PyBE asks Bob. That is, we
recommend Bob to label {Home,Memo} as deny for re-
solving this inconsistency, Bob may accept our recom-
mendation, or reject it and make an exception. Using
such interactive recommendations, PyBE engages Bob
in correcting potential errors.
Figure 3 shows the nearest neighbor graph for
5
{Home,Photo}, and illustrates another type of incon-
sistency. In this case, there is no majority consensus
among the neighbors of {Home,Photo}. A similar
situation exists in the graph for {Home,Document},
which we do not show due to space constraints. If we
look at the two graphs in Figure 2 and Figure 3, we real-
ize that changing the policy decision of {Home,Memo}
removes both the inconsistencies. Thus, PyBE capital-
izes on the possibility that a few examples may cause
the most noise, and recommends the user to change their
labels. In our algorithm described in Section 5.3, we de-
scribe graph invariants to identify noise, and a greedy
algorithm to find the optimal change. Section 7 demon-
strates that our interactive approach finds five times as
many errors as manual reviews by users.
Note that we do not claim to detect all errors, as the
users’ examples may be completely consistent, but may
still have errors. Instead, we recommend a best effort ap-
proach for engaging the user in detecting potential errors.
5 The PyBE Algorithm
This section describes our algorithm for predicting pol-
icy decisions, and the active learning approach. As stated
previously, distance between policy examples is the dis-
tance between their scenarios, and policy decisions are
the labels for the scenarios.
Our policy scenarios are Boolean functions over n
variables (i.e., tags), denoted by Bn. However, we re-
strict our attention to functions that are conjunctions of
variables (e.g. x1 ∧ x3 ∧ x5). Such a function f can be
represented as a set I( f ) ⊆ {1,2, · · · ,n} (e.g., if f =
x1∧ x3∧ x5, then I( f ) = {1,3,5}). Our policy scenarios
belong to this restricted class (denoted byPn).
We had two requirements for the learning-algorithm
to infer policy decisions: (I): non-parametric (does not
rely on models with a fixed set of parameters). (II): easy
explanation (easy to present to the user how the policy
was inferred). For this reason we chose a variant of the k
nearest neighbor (kNN) classifier [31]. A kNN algorithm
simply “looks at” the k points in the training set that are
nearest to the test input x, counts how many members
of each class are in the set, and returns that empirical
fraction as the estimate.
Recall that our goal is to label a policy scenario p ∈
Pn with the decision 1 (i.e., allow) or 0 (i.e., deny). We
are also given a set of policy scenarios along with known
labels (i.e., policy decisions). Our algorithm is inspired
by the kNN algorithm and works as follows: given a new
policy scenario p ∈Pn with an unknown label, we find
the set of k policy scenarios N(p) = {p1, · · · , pk} clos-
est to p according to the metric µ (described in the next
subsection) and then associate the label to p that corre-
sponds to the majority labels of the policy scenarios in
N(p). Our variant of kNN only considers scenarios at
the closest distance for inclusion in N(p). We describe
how to address situations with no majority in Section 5.4.
We use active learning to assist the user in correcting
potential labeling errors in the user’s policy examples.
When we find that certain conditions are not true (e.g.,
the label of a policy scenario q ∈Pn is different from
the majority label among its neighbors N(q)), we recom-
mend a change in the label (e.g., change allow to deny).
We now describe our metric µ , its weighted form µw,
and the active learning phase. We design a new metric
as integrating weights into existing metrics (e.g., jaccard
distance) may incur significant re-engineering.
5.1 The Metric
Let f and g be two Boolean functions over n variables
x1,x2, · · · ,xn. A metric between f and g (denoted by
µ( f ,g)) can be defined as follows:
1− ]( f ⊕g)
2n
Where ⊕ represents exclusive-or and ](h) is the num-
ber of satisfying assignments of the Boolean function h.
Recall that computing the number of satisfying assign-
ments of a Boolean function is a hard problem (]-P com-
plete [3]). However, for our special case where scenarios
are conjunctions of variables, this metric is easy to com-
pute. Next, we describe the metric for the functions in
the setPn.
Consider two functions f1 and f2. Let [n] =
{1,2, · · · ,n}. Consider three sets of indices I1,2 (variables
neither in f1 nor f2), I12 (variables in f1 but not in f2) and
I21 (variables in f2 but not in f1); i.e., I1,2 = [n]\ (I( f1)∪
I( f2)), I12 = I( f1) \ I( f2), and I21 = I( f2) \ I( f1). An as-
signment σ is a Boolean vector of size n of the form
〈b1,b2, · · · ,bn〉 and f (σ) denotes the value of the func-
tion f for assignment σ .
Consider an assignment σ = 〈b1,b2, · · · ,bn〉 such that
f1(σ) = 1 and f2(σ) = 0. Then for all i ∈ I( f1), bi = 1,
and there should be at least one i ∈ I21 such that bi =
0. For i ∈ I1,2, bi can assume any value. Consider all
the indices in I21 . There should be at least one j ∈ I21 ,
such that b j = 0 (we want f2(σ) = 0). Therefore, the
number of satisfying assignments σ , such that f1(σ) = 1
and f2(σ) = 0 is
2k1,2(2k2 −1)
where k1,2 = |I1,2| and k2 = |I21 |. Explanation for the for-
mula is as follows: all variables with indices in the set
I1,2 can be given any value (resulting in the term 2k1,2 ).
All the variables with indices in I21 can be given any val-
ues as long as one of them is 0, so an assignment where
all variables with indices in I21 is assigned 1 is excluded
(this results in the term 2k2 −1).
A symmetric argument shows that the number of satis-
fying assignments σ such that f1(σ) = 0 and f2(σ) = 1
is 2k1,2(2k1 −1)
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where k1,2 = |I1,2| and k1 = |I12 |. Adding the two terms,
we have that ]( f1⊕ f2) is 2k1,2(2k1 +2k2−2). Therefore,
the metric µ( f1, f2) in this case is:
1− 2
k1,2(2k1 +2k2 −2)
2n
where k1,2 = |I1,2|, k1 = |I12 |, and k2 = |I21 |. Intuitively,
k1 is the number of variables that appear in f1 but not
in f2, k2 is the number of variables that appear in f2
but not in f1, and k1,2 is the number of variables that
appear in neither f1 or f2. Let k = n− k1,2, which is
the number of variables that appear in f1 and f2 (i.e.,
k = |I( f1)∪ I( f2)|). The metric µ( f1, f2) can be simpli-
fied as follows:
µ( f1, f2) = 1− 2
k1 +2k2 −2
2k
Note that higher values of µ indicate closeness.
5.2 The Weighted Metric
For security policies, some variables are more impor-
tant than others; e.g., recall the Home tag from Bob’s
policy in Section 4.2. To incorporate the importance of
variables we introduce a weighted version of our met-
ric. As before, we will consider a Boolean function
over n variables x1,x2, · · · ,xn. However, in this case we
have two weights w0i and w
1
i associated with each index
1 ≤ i ≤ n. The weight associated with an assignment
σ = 〈b1, · · · ,bn〉 (denoted as w(σ)) is
n
∑
i=1
w0i (1−bi)+w1i bi .
Given a set of Boolean assignments S, define w(S) as
∑α∈S w(α) – the sum of weights of all assignments in S.
Given a Boolean function f , w( f ) is the weight of the set
of satisfying assignments of f . Using a simple recursive
argument, the weight of all 2n assignments {0,1}n is:
n
∏
i=1
(w0i +w
1
i )
Given n pair of weights (w01,w
1
1), · · · ,(w0n,w1n), a
weighted metric between two Boolean functions f and
g (denoted as µw( f ,g)) is defined as follows:
1− w( f ⊕g)
∏ni=1(w0i +w1i )
Note that if for all i we have w0i = w
1
i = 1, we get the
previous metric (i.e., the unweighted case).
As before, consider two Boolean functions f1 and f2
with index sets I( f1) and I( f2). Let the index sets I12
and I21 be as defined before. Define the following three
quantities:
z1 = ∏
i∈I12
(w0i +w
1
i ) − ∏
i∈I12
w0i
z2 = ∏
i∈I21
(w0i +w
1
i ) − ∏
i∈I21
w0i
z = ∏
i∈I( f1)∪I( f2)
(w0i +w
1
i )
The metric µw( f1, f2) can be defined as:
µw( f1, f2) = 1− z1+ z2z
The argument is exactly same as before. The reader can
check that for the unweighted case (i.e. for all i we have
w0i = w
1
i = 1) we get the previous metric back.
Setting weights: Next we describe an algorithm to set
weights. Given a set of variables V = {x1, · · · ,xn}, sup-
pose we are given a partial order  on V (e.g., xi  x j
means that x j is more “important” than xi). Next we con-
struct a function L : V → [n] that assigns integers between
1 and n to each variable in V and has the property that
xi  x j and j 6= i implies that L(xi) > L(x j).1 We can
assign higher weights w1i to variables that have a lower
value according to the function L and set all the weights
w0i to 1. Note that it is not necessary to precisely define a
mechanism for assigning weights, as long as the ordering
imposed by L is preserved.
5.3 Active Learning
Ideally, users would provide accurate examples to PyBE.
However, as even expert users are not always accu-
rate [18,55], we expect a small margin of error in the pol-
icy decisions provided by the user; e.g., a typo resulting
in 1 being accidentally marked as 0. We use active learn-
ing to find and correct potentially incorrect policy deci-
sions, by asking users to relabel certain chosen scenarios.
Relabeling samples to remove errors has been shown to
be effective even with non-experts by prior work [43].
In our approach, the scenarios and their nearest neigh-
bors are arranged as a graph, which allows us to relabel
existing scenarios in a systematic manner if certain in-
variants on the graph are not true. In other words, the
graph we are about to describe gives us a systematic way
to evaluate the conditions that may indicate user error.
Let G = (V,E,LV ,LE) be a 4-tuple where V ⊆Pn is
the set of labeled policy scenarios, E ⊆V×V is the set of
edges, LV maps each vertex v ∈ V with a label 1 (signi-
fying allow) and 0 (signifying deny), and LE labels each
edge e ∈ E with a non-negative real value (i.e., LE(v,v′)
is µ(v,v′), which is the distance between the scenarios v
and v′). The set of neighbors N(v) of a vertex v ∈ V is
the set {v′ | (v,v′) ∈ E} and intuitively represents all the
nearest-neighbors of the policy scenario v.
(Inv-1): Majority label exists. This invariant states that
for all v ∈ V , its set of neighbors N(v) have a majority
label (i.e,. more than |N(v)|2 vertices in N(v) have the same
label LV (v)).
(Inv-2): Agreement with the majority label. This in-
variant states that if invariant Inv-1 is true, then for every
1 Such a function can be constructed by topologically sorting a di-
rected graph whose nodes are V and there is an edge from x j to xi ( j 6= i)
iff xi  x j .
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pq r
1
0 1
dd
(a) p violates Inv-1,
i.e., no majority label
p
q r
1
0 0
dd
(b) p violates Inv-
2, i.e., disagrees with
majority label
Figure 4: NN graph for vertex p, consisting of neighbors
q and r at the closest distance d, violates Inv-1 and Inv-2.
v ∈V its label LV (v) agrees with the majority label of its
neighbors N(v).
Intuitively we want the graph G corresponding to our
policies to satisfy invariants Inv-1 and Inv-2. If the graph
G violates either of the invariants, then we recommend
relabeling of the policy scenarios to the user.
Figure 4 shows instances of the graph for some vertex
p that violate the invariants. In Figure 4a, there is no ma-
jority label among p′s neighbors, which can be resolved
by relabeling either q or r. Further, in Figure 4b, the label
on p disagrees with the majority, which can be resolved
by relabeling p.
We use a simple greedy approach to recommend
changes: Consider a function V (G) that counts the total
violations of both Inv-1 and Inv-2 in graph G. Further,
consider a function C (v,G) that measures the impact of
a potential label change on violations, i.e., returns the de-
crease in V (G) after a temporary change in the label of v
(i.e., LV (v)). The label change that causes the maximum
decrease in V (G) is optimal. Therefore, at each iteration,
we find the optimal vertex, vopt , by maximizing C (v,G)
over all v ∈ V \Vvisited , where Vvisited is the set of all ver-
tices that have been recommended to the user previously.
We add vopt to Vvisited , and recommend the user to change
LV (vopt). If the user accepts, we change LV (vopt). We re-
iterate until all the vertices are visited or until there are
no more violations.
5.4 Prediction with No Majority
As described previously, we predict the label (i.e., policy
decision) for a new policy scenario p as the majority la-
bel of its nearest neighbors N(p). If there is no majority
label, we use the following method for prediction:
We eliminate the first neighbor that is not a mutual
neighbor, i.e., if there is a labeled policy scenario q such
that q ∈ N(p) but p /∈ N(q), we remove q from N(p),
thereby converging on a majority. In case such elimi-
nation is not possible, i.e., if all neighbors in N(p) are
mutual neighbors, we deny by default. Our method con-
siders the value of the distance between neighbors to re-
solve a tie, instead of randomly discarding one scenario
(i.e., by considering only an odd number of scenarios in
N(p)). In Section 7, we demonstrate that PyBE performs
better than a baseline of random guessing, and that such
cases were rare, i.e., less than 6% test scenarios had no
majority, and less than 3% were denied by default.
6 Evaluation
We performed an IRB-approved feasibility study with
expert users to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach.
We chose experts under the hypothesis that they prefer
more complex policies, the complexity of which makes
them challenging to predict. Support for this hypothe-
sis comes from the fact that non-expert users are more
likely to employ binary security practices, (e.g., only vis-
iting known sites rather than deciding based on security-
related attributes like usage of https [18]) and evidence
that knowledge of security risks can increase sensitivity
to security when making data decisions [36]. Note that
no personally identifiable information (PII) was collected
from the participants.
We plan to release our tool and source code after pub-
lication, to allow a broader audience to use PyBE. A san-
itized version of our dataset will also be released. The
following research questions motivate our study:
RQ1 How accurate are our predictions for random, un-
labeled scenarios that may occur at runtime?
RQ2 What are the causes for incorrect predictions?
RQ3 Do users make mistakes in their examples?
RQ4 Does our active learning approach help the user
find mistakes in their examples?
This section describes the study setup, the data collec-
tion and experiments. Section 7 describes the results.
Due to space constraints, this section describes the core
methodology of the feasibility study; the literal scripts
used during the study can be found in Appendix B.
6.1 Study Setup
In this study, participants were asked to consider a smart-
phone environment, where personal and work data would
be at risk of unauthorized exfiltration from the device.
We now describe the participants (i.e., expert users), pol-
icy targets and information tags involved in the study.
Expert Users: We recruited 8 graduate student re-
searchers from a security research lab for this study (de-
noted as P1→P8). Our participants had at least 1 aca-
demic year of experience (2.5 years on average) in secu-
rity research at the time of this study, including at least
one research project and two graduate-level courses in
security or privacy. We use the security-focused course-
work and research as an indicator of general security-
awareness, and assume the participants to be well-aware
of their own security and privacy requirements. Ad-
ditionally, we confirmed that all our participants used
their smartphones for both work and personal data. Fi-
nally, through an informal discussion of participant back-
ground knowledge, we confirmed that the participants
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Table 3: Policy targets and the actions they control.
Policy Target Action Controlled
WorkCloud Export of data to the enterprise cloud
PersonalCloud Export of data to the personal cloud
WorkEmailApp Export of data by the enterprise email app
PersonalEmailApp Export of data by the personal email app
SocialApp Export of data by the social network app
were aware of the threat of exfiltration of work and per-
sonal data by third party applications on smartphones, as
discussed by prior work (e.g., TaintDroid [11]).
Policy Targets: Table 3 provides the policy targets (i.e.,
policies) used in our study. The targets are similar to the
WorkCloud target discussed in Section 4, and either (a)
restrict the destination Web domain to which data can be
exported (i.e., WorkCloud and PersonalCloud) or (b) re-
strict the exporters (i.e., applications) that are permitted
to export data; i.e., WorkEmailApp, PersonalEmailApp
and SocialApp regulate export by the user’s work email
client, personal email client, and social network client
(e.g., the Facebook app) respectively. As described pre-
viously, each target is treated as an independent policy.
Information Tags: We provided users with 9 prede-
fined secrecy tags, based on tags available in popu-
lar note-taking applications (e.g., Google Keep, Ever-
note). To enable our experts to create any complex pol-
icy they desired, we allowed them to create new tags as
well. The tags (user-created or predefined) were primar-
ily of two kinds, namely tags that defined the location or
time at which the information was created (e.g., Work,
Afterhours) or the type or class of information (e.g.,
Receipt, WhiteboardSnapshot). The tags used
in this study are provided in Appendix A.
6.2 Data Collection
This section describes the approach used for collecting
the policy examples and weights from participants.
1. Collecting Policy Examples: Participants were pro-
vided with our predefined tags, but were also allowed to
create their own tags. Participants were instructed that
they could combine tags into complex scenarios for cre-
ating examples. We placed no constraint on the number
of example scenarios each participant could provide. For
each scenario, participants were required to label policy
decisions for the 5 targets described previously in Ta-
ble 3. Note that we collected labels for two more targets,
but discarded them before testing to reduce user fatigue.
A preliminary analysis of the examples collected from
our participants led to two interesting observations: (1)
Our participants created a total of 31 unique tags, out of
which about 58% (or 23) were specific to individual par-
ticipants, while only 7 tags were commonly used by all in
their examples, and (2) Out of the 246 example scenarios
collected across participants, over 76% were specific to
individual participants, and only 7 were common among
all 8 participants. These observations indicate that rele-
1 Suggestion: For {Note}, WorkCloud = DENY. Agree?(y/n)
Listing 1: A suggestion made by the PyBE algorithm
during the interactive review process.
vant data-use scenarios may be unique to the individual,
even among student researchers from the same research
lab, further motivating our research into generating user-
specific policies for user-specific data.
2. Obtaining Weights: On average, each participant
used about 14 unique tags in their examples. As order-
ing a large number of tags can be tiring, we categorized
tags into semantic groups. The participants were pro-
vided with this semantic grouping, and were first (1) al-
lowed to customize group memberships of tags as per
their understanding, and then (2) instructed to provide a
partial order over the groups in a spreadsheet. Partici-
pants were provided with a basic partial order generated
by the authors, and could start from scratch, or customize
the provided ordering. We confirmed each partial order
relation by reading it out to the user; e.g., by asking if
“j is more important than i” to confirm i;j. We then
transformed the orders to weights using the approach de-
scribed in Section 5.2. For additional illustration, Ap-
pendix B.2 provides P1’s tag groups (Figure 6) partial
order on the groups ( Figure 7).
Finally, participants were informed that they could
provide different partial orders for different policies, but
most participants chose to keep a single general order.
We describe the impact of this decision in Section 8.
6.3 Experiments
This section describes the experiments for identifying
user errors and testing prediction for random scenarios.
1. Identifying Errors: The review of examples was car-
ried out 3 months after the initial specification, as most
participants were unavailable over the summer break.
We performed a two-step experiment to help participants
identify and correct errors in their policy decisions.
First, participants performed a manual review of their
initial specification. Participants were provided with a
spreadsheet containing their policy examples (one sheet
per policy target), and could change any policy deci-
sion they desired. For each update, participants were in-
structed to indicate a cause to justify the change (e.g.,
correcting an error, change of mind, inability to de-
cide). Finally, participants provided a justification for
each change (e.g., “Work is confidential”), providing the
helpful context for analyzing the results (Section 8).
After the manual review, we performed a PyBE-
assisted review using the approach described in Sec-
tion 5.3. We treat each participant-policy combination
as a separate policy specification problem; hence, a sep-
arate review was performed for each such case (i.e., 8
users and 5 policies make 40 total cases). As we used
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the changed examples from the manual review; any er-
rors discovered using this approach were additional. Our
algorithm presented the participant with a series of sug-
gestions (i.e., examples with corrected policy decisions,
as shown in Listing 1). If the participant accepted the
suggestion, we confirmed with the participant that the
original decision was in error, and recorded it as an error
found by PyBE. If the participant rejected, we asked for
a short justification to understand the participant’s pol-
icy preferences. We stopped at 15 suggestions for each
participant-policy case to limit fatigue.
2. Testing with Random Scenarios: For each partici-
pant, we randomly generated n/2 new policy scenarios,
where n was the number of scenarios initially provided
by the participant. The random scenarios were created
with the tags used in the participant’s initial examples.
The intuition is that the tags provided by the participant
are relevant to the participant; hence scenarios composed
of them must be relevant as well. To mitigate labeling fa-
tigue, the random scenarios included at most 3 tags.
Participants provided the ground truth policy decisions
for their test scenarios, for each of the five policy tar-
gets. Apart from indicating “Allow” or “Deny”, partic-
ipants were also provided the “I don’t know”, in which
case we substituted the scenario with another random test
scenario. We predicted the policy decision for each test
scenario using our algorithm. We then asked participants
to confirm their decisions for incorrect predictions, pro-
vide short justifications, and conducted short, informal
interviews that helped us gain insight into the decisions.
7 Results
This section describes the results of our experiments, i.e.,
PyBE’s accuracy in predicting policy decisions for new
scenarios, and its effectiveness in assisting participants in
finding incorrect policy decisions in their examples. We
start by briefly describing the datasets collected during
the initial policy specification and testing; a detailed split
across participants can be found in Appendix C.
Specification dataset: The 8 participants provided 246
example scenarios in total, with policy decisions for 5
policy targets, resulting in a total of 1,230 initial labeled
policy examples.
Testing dataset: We generated a total of 122 random
test scenarios across 8 participants, which when labeled
with ground-truth policy decisions by participants for 5
policies, resulted in 610 test examples.
7.1 Accuracy of Predictions
Our algorithm predicted decisions for all of the partic-
ipants’ test scenarios.2 The actual prediction time was
negligible (i.e., less than 1 second for all the examples
2We test with random samples instead of cross-validation, as the
latter is generally used to test “models”, i.e., in supervised learning.
per participant). Further, for less than 6% (36 out of 610)
of our test examples we had no majority label (i.e., a tie).
Applying the tiebreaker discussed in Section 5.4 resolved
19 of these ties, while the rest (i.e., 3% or 17 out of 610)
were denied by default. We now discuss the accuracy of
PyBE’s predictions.
On comparing our predicted decisions with ground-
truth decisions provided by participants, we observe that
PyBE predicts policy decisions with an average accu-
racy of over 76% across all participants (RQ1). When
analyzing the accuracy, it is important to note that each
participant-policy combination is treated as an indepen-
dent policy specification problem, and hence forms a
separate test case. We first define a baseline and naive
approach against which we evaluate PyBE’s accuracy.
1. The CoinFlip baseline: The CoinFlip baseline pro-
vides the measure of accuracy of random guessing, with
an equal probability of a 0/1 outcome on each flip.
2. The MostFreq naive approach: We define MostFreq
as an approach that predicts the most frequent or majority
policy decision from the specification dataset, indepen-
dently for each participant-policy problem. For example,
if P1 generally allows export to WorkCloud, MostFreq
will predict allow for all new test examples for that the
P1-WorkCloud policy specification problem. The insight
behind MostFreq is that a naive learner is likely to pick
the majority class to benefit from the consistent trend in
the participant’s policy decisions.
Table 4 shows the comparison of PyBE’s accuracy
with CoinFlip, for each of the 40 participant-policy
cases. PyBE not only performs better in terms of average
accuracy (i.e., 76>50), but also for most (i.e., all but 3,
or 92%) of the participant-policy problems.
Table 5 shows a comparison between the performance
of PyBE and the naive approach MostFreq. PyBE not
only performs better than MostFreq in terms of average
accuracy (i.e., 76>71), but also in 29 out of 40 (i.e.,
72.5%) participant-policy cases, and for 75% of the par-
ticipants. Note that although MostFreq’s average accu-
racy can be said to be close to PyBE, it has high variance,
with accuracy dropping to 17% in some cases. This is be-
cause of MostFreq’s over-dependence on the probability
distribution of the training samples, a flaw PyBE is not
susceptible to. We discuss the causes of incorrect predic-
tions (RQ2) in Section 8.
7.2 Effectiveness of Active Learning
Table 6 shows the number of labeling errors found by
the participant through the manual review, followed by
the additional errors found using PyBE’s interactive ap-
proach. Errors found by PyBE’s approach are additional
as we use the corrected dataset from the manual review
for the PyBE-assisted review, as described in Section 6.3.
Out of 1,230 total examples in the specification
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Table 4: Accuracy of PyBE in comparison with the CoinFlip (abbreviated to CF) baseline, for all 40 user-policy cases.
Cases where the accuracy of CF is greater are highlighted in bold.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Policy Target PyBE CF PyBE CF PyBE CF PyBE CF PyBE CF PyBE CF PyBE CF PyBE CF
WorkCloud 0.96 0.50 0.73 0.48 0.66 0.49 0.83 0.49 0.56 0.51 0.93 0.50 0.90 0.49 0.67 0.49
PersonalCloud 0.77 0.50 0.55 0.5 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.52 0.75 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.40 0.51 0.71 0.49
WorkEmailApp 0.96 0.50 0.55 0.51 0.83 0.47 0.83 0.47 0.63 0.51 0.86 0.51 0.90 0.50 0.76 0.49
PersonalEmailApp 0.77 0.51 0.55 0.49 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.48 0.63 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.67 0.51
SocialApp 0.81 0.51 0.73 0.49 0.75 0.52 0.92 0.49 0.94 0.50 1.00 0.51 1.00 0.52 0.91 0.50
Average 0.85 0.50 0.62 0.49 0.85 0.50 0.82 0.49 0.70 0.51 0.76 0.51 0.74 0.50 0.74 0.50
∗The CoinFlip baseline values shown are the mean of 50 executions with a 95% confidence interval less than 0.03.
Table 5: Accuracy of PyBE in comparison with the MostFreq (abbreviated to MF) approach, for all 40 user-policy
cases. Cases where the accuracy of MF is greater are highlighted in bold.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Policy Target PyBE MF PyBE MF PyBE MF PyBE MF PyBE MF PyBE MF PyBE MF PyBE MF
WorkCloud 0.96 0.85 0.73 0.63 0.66 0.17 0.83 0.75 0.56 0.88 0.93 0.71 0.90 0.70 0.67 0.43
PersonalCloud 0.77 0.69 0.55 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.71 0.71
WorkEmailApp 0.96 0.85 0.55 0.64 0.83 0.17 0.83 0.75 0.63 0.81 0.86 0.71 0.90 0.80 0.76 0.48
PersonalEmailApp 0.77 0.69 0.55 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.63 0.81 0.50 0.79 0.50 0.80 0.67 0.71
SocialApp 0.81 0.73 0.73 0.46 0.75 0.92 0.92 0.58 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.91
Average 0.85 0.76 0.62 0.71 0.85 0.65 0.82 0.72 0.70 0.85 0.76 0.68 0.74 0.70 0.74 0.65
dataset, we observe 96 total errors (i.e., 7.8%), with at
least one labeling error in most participant-policy cases
(i.e., 30 our of 40) (RQ3). While participants identify
some errors manually, PyBE’s semi-automated process
helps the participant identify and correct the maximum
number of errors (80 out of 96, or about 83%). Further,
for all 8 participants, the total errors (across policies)
found by PyBE are equal to or more than the participant’s
manual review (RQ4).
We note that P1 did not find any errors manually, nor
did they agree to PyBE’s recommendations as they had
confidence in their examples. Further, our accuracy is
also the highest for P1 as seen in Table 4. However,
given the absence of such a trend in other cases, we do
no claim any relation between user errors and accuracy.
8 Analysis of Results
PyBE is the first step towards our vision of a policy as-
sistant, and one of our objectives is to learn lessons for
future work. With this motivation, we performed an in-
depth study of our results to identify the general causes
of incorrect predictions.
We manually analyzed each of the 141 incorrectly pre-
dicted test examples, using the following information
collected during our study: (1) the justifications pro-
vided by the participants for their decisions, (2) the near-
est neighbors of the test example, (3) the weights of the
tags involved, and (4) all examples from the specification
dataset that contain tags in common with the test exam-
ple. The rest of this section describes the four causes
of incorrect predictions that we identified. A detailed
breakdown of the causes across participants and policies
is provided in Table 10 in Appendix D.
1. Misconfigured Weights: We found that a majority
of our incorrect predictions (79 out of 141, or over 56%)
were caused because the weights set by the participants
contradicted their actual security preferences. We con-
firmed our findings using justifications from participants
that clearly indicated the tag or security preference that
influenced their policy decision for a test example.
For instance, consider an incorrect prediction for
P1’s PersonalCloud policy, where PyBE predicted
the policy decision allow for the test example
{WhiteboardSnapshot,Work,ScannedDocument}. The
user provided the ground-truth decision of deny, and
justified with the quote “no work data to personal
cloud”. That is, the tag Work was confidential and
hence important to P1 with respect to the Personal-
Cloud policy target. This preference of Work be-
ing important is also consistent for all but one of
P1’s examples containing Work, as shown in Ta-
ble 7. However, this importance was not reflected in
the weights, i.e., P1 mistakenly assigned Work data
a lower weight (i.e., weight 2) by ordering it lower
than personal data (i.e., weight 4). This resulted in
the test example being matched with personal examples
(e.g., {MedicalFacility,ScannedDocument})
that allowed export for PersonalCloud.
On raising the weight of Work to 5 (i.e., above per-
sonal tags), the test example was correctly found closer
to {Work,ScannedDocument}, resulting in a correct
prediction of deny. Note that this increase in weight
is not arbitrary, but guided by evidence of the user’s
security preferences. On correcting all misconfigured
weights, we manually confirmed that our overall accu-
racy rose to 89%. This includes most predictions for P2
and P5 for whom PyBE had the lowest accuracy.
Since misconfigured weights caused the maximum in-
correct predictions (79 out of 141, or 56%), we investi-
gated further, and made two interesting observations:
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Table 6: The number of errors identified via manual review of examples (abbreviated as MR), and the additional errors
found in the PyBE-assisted review. Cases where the manual review finds more errors are highlighted in bold.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Policy Target MR PyBE MR PyBE MR PyBE MR PyBE MR PyBE MR PyBE MR PyBE MR PyBE
WorkCloud 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 1 0 4 0 2 0 1 0 5
PersonalCloud 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 4 2
WorkEmailApp 0 0 0 3 0 3 1 1 2 2 0 4 1 1 0 5
PersonalEmailApp 0 0 0 3 1 2 0 1 0 6 0 5 0 0 2 1
SocialApp 0 0 0 4 0 3 1 1 0 1 0 5 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 17 1 9 4 4 2 16 2 19 1 2 6 13
Table 7: A subset of policy examples specified by P1,
which includes only those examples that contain Work
No. Scenario Policy Decision
1 {Work, ScannedDocument} deny
2 {WhiteboardSnapshot, Work} deny
3 {Work, BusinessCard} deny
4 {Work, Audio} deny
5 {Work, Postit} deny
6 {Work} deny
7 {Work, CalendarLink} deny
8 {Work, Receipts} deny
9 {Photos, Work} allow
Observation 1: Inaccurate predictions resulted from par-
ticipants only considering privacy preferences when set-
ting weights. Recall that our participants were provided
with the option of setting different weight-group orders
for different policy targets in Section 6.2. All partici-
pants (except P8) set only a general order for all 5 policy
targets, which only accounted for the their privacy pref-
erences. As a result, higher-weighted personal tags (e.g.,
MedicalFacility, Home) had more influence on the
policy decision, irrespective of the actual policy target.
However, participants labeled examples based on their
policy target-specific security preferences (e.g., no work
to PersonlCloud. This resulted in incorrect predictions,
as seen in P1’s example previously.
Note that this phenomenon occurs only because our
tags are semantically related to the policy targets (e.g.,
Work to WorkCloud). We confirmed that at least 26 in-
correct predictions (out of 79 due to weights) were false
negatives in predicting the PersonalCloud and Person-
alEmailApp targets, because participants considers pri-
vacy for weights, and security for labeling.
Observation 2: “Important” may not just mean confi-
dential. In at least 14 of the test-examples incorrectly
predicted due to weights, participants wanted to set a
high weight for a non-confidential tag, i.e., to declassify
data if a certain tag were present in the scenario. This
was in complete contrast with the initial understanding
of the participants while setting weights, i.e., that confi-
dential tags would have high weights.
2. Policy Change: A significant minority (30 out of 141,
or over 21%) of our incorrect predictions resulted from
a change in the participants’ policies, i.e., when partici-
pants explicitly disagreed with an earlier assumption.
For example, P8’s policy changed for the tag
School. During the initial specification, P8 assumed
School and Work to be different due to off-campus
employment. However, before testing, P8 started work-
ing at the school, which resulted in similar decisions for
School and Work. P8 admitted to this change during
the post-testing interview. All cases in this category were
similarly confirmed.
3. Unconfirmed Policy Change: For a small number of
incorrect predictions (15 out of 141, or about 11%), we
observed a clear contradiction between the participant’s
examples during specification and testing, but could not
get a confirmation from the participant. For example, for
P8’s test example {SavedToDevice,Audio}, the
ground truth label allows export for the WorkCloud pol-
icy, but all except one ofP8’s initially specified examples
containing SavedToDevice or Audio deny export to
the WorkCloud. Without additional information, we clas-
sify such contradictions as unconfirmed policy changes.
4. Tag Confusion: The least number of errors (i.e.,
12 out of 141, or about 8.5%) were caused due to the
ambiguity of some tags. The location or time-based
tags (e.g., Home and Afterhours) were intended to in-
dicate the location or time of creation of data. How-
ever, as we did not place strict constraints, our partic-
ipants also created scenarios where such tags could be
used by themselves (e.g., the scenario {Home} could
mean data created at home). Justifications indicated
that while participants could comprehend the scenar-
ios they had created, a few random test scenarios (in
case of 3 participants) caused confusion. For example,
{Afterhours,Audio,Document} could mean Au-
dio created after hours, and added to a document whose
origin is unknown, or a document created after hours,
and added to an audio recording.
Finally, we exclude five incorrect predictions from
P8’s test dataset from our categorization, i.e., 3 for Per-
sonalEmailApp and 2 for WorkEmailApp, as the partici-
pant was unable to decide unless they knew the identity
of the email receiver, which gave us no information. We
did not face this situation with any other user or example.
9 Lessons
The lessons we learned from our feasibility study high-
light aspects of correctly using PyBE in practice, and also
motivate problems for future work.
Lesson 1: Weight assignment should reflect security, as
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well as general privacy preferences. If policy targets are
semantically related to the tags, a generic weight assign-
ment for multiple targets may be inaccurate.
Lesson 2: Addressing “potential” change in the policy
is imperative. The user may change some or all of their
security policy goals without informing the system.
Lesson 3: The notion of importance depends on the se-
curity goals, as users may want to consider extremely
non-confidential data as important (i.e., declassifiers). If
the system’s goal is security, then the most confidential
tag may have the highest weight; and for usability, the
most non-confidential tag.
Lesson 4: Tag semantics should be carefully considered
for applying PyBE. Users may be able to reason about
examples they create, and may even desire the express-
ibility of multiple label semantics (i.e., “created at” or
“derived data”); however, this expressibility may cause
confusion when reasoning about random examples.
10 Future Directions
Our evaluation of PyBE demonstrates feasibility, and
shows promise for further exploration in this area. We
now discuss two future directions, namely (1) adapting
PyBE for non-experts and (2) adapting to change.
Adapting PyBE for non-experts: Measuring the us-
ability of PyBE with non-experts is a natural direction
for future research. Additionally, we make the following
recommendations for tasks that may be performed differ-
ently for non-experts.
1. Collecting examples: To ease the burden of creating
tags, non-experts may be provided with a large and di-
verse collection of tags (e.g., the 40 tags obtained in our
study) as a baseline for specifying examples. Further, us-
able interfaces may be considered for non experts (e.g.,
“interactive dropdowns” [20, 21] to collect examples).
2. Collecting Weights: Collecting weights from non-
experts is another challenge for future work. Future work
may consider using visual “sliders” for weight collection,
for precise and usable weight assignments.
3. System Integration: PyBE may be integrated into ex-
isting systems that protect user-specific data from disclo-
sure to the network (e.g., Weir [32] and Aquifer [33]). On
such systems, users may want to override policy predic-
tions by PyBE at runtime, or provide feedback, requiring
a trusted path between the user and PyBE. A feedback
mechanism may also improve future predictions.
Adapting to Change: Another direction for future work
is detecting potential change in the user’s policy. While
detecting change may be impossible without external in-
put in some cases, there is value in evaluating solutions
in other cases. Lessons from prior work that measures
policy changes for file access control may be used to de-
termine the causes for policy change [46]. Persuasive
technologies designed by prior research may also pro-
vide ways to encourage the user to report change when
it happens [7, 30, 35]. Future work may also be directed
at predicting which example or tag is likely to change,
using existing information (e.g., weights, frequency in
examples). Our intuition is that strategies used for cache
replacement (e.g., least recently used or LRU [42]) may
apply, at least as a starting point.
Finally, active learning may also be used to suggest
new examples to the user, which is not the focus of this
paper, and lies in the broader scope for future work.
11 Threats to Validity
In this paper, we provide a general framework for spec-
ifying policies for user-specific data. Individual aspects
of our framework may be iteratively refined in the future.
We identify specific limitations of the current state of our
approach and its evaluation as follows:
We evaluate feasibility with expert users. While our
participants provide a significant number of policy ex-
amples, the number of participants is small, hence we
cannot generalize to the broader user population. How-
ever, because this specialized set of users are likely to
have more complex policies than most users, we view
our feasibility study as a sufficient “stress test” of PyBE.
Additionally, since even expert users can make bad se-
curity decisions [55], our expert-specified policy exam-
ples are not expected to be error-free. Indeed, we use our
interactive approach to help users find potential errors.
Our policy scenario is described as a conjunction of
variables (Section 4.1). While it is easy to see how such
a format may generalize to any policy that may be ex-
pressed as a conjunction of data objects or conditions, a
thorough evaluation of expressibility may be required.
Finally, in Section 5.3, we propose a simple greedy
approach to satisfy graph invariants. A more complex
approach (e.g., using dynamic programming) may be in-
tegrated into PyBE without any significant changes.
12 Conclusion
We introduced the paradigm of Policy by Example
(PyBE) for user-specific policy specification. PyBE en-
ables users to express data-use scenarios in policy exam-
ples, and predicts policy decisions for new scenarios. In
our feasibility study, PyBE demonstrated better predic-
tion performance than naive approaches. A key contri-
bution of PyBE is its active learning approach for engag-
ing users in finding and potentially incorrect policy de-
cisions in their examples, which we demonstrated to be
five times as effective as manual reviews. Finally, we an-
alyzed our incorrect predictions and learned lessons that
motivate future research in this promising new domain.
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A Tags used in the User Study
Figure 5 shows the tags used in this study. We provided
9 tags, while the rest were created by users.
B Feasibility Study details
The data collection and experiments were performed us-
ing semi-structured interviews. Most tasks (i.e., col-
lecting examples, reviewing examples, and testing) took
about 75 minutes, whereas collecting weights took about
20 minutes on average. While breaks were offered as a
part of the experimental design, no participant elected to
take their break.
B.1 Collecting Examples
• In this task, you will provide context-policy exam-
ples.
• You will be given a list of predefined context tags.
You can use 0 or more of these tags, and also create
your own tags.
• You may combine tags to describe the context of
a scenario. You will then be required to indicate a
policy decision (i.e., 0 for deny and one for allow)
for the policies provided.
• Each line on the example sheet has space for the
context (i.e., combination of tags), and a column for
each policy.
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Figure 5: Tags used in the user study, and the number of users (out of 8) that use each tag.
B.2 Collecting Weights
This phase consisted of two tasks, grouping tags and or-
dering groups. We provide the instructions given to users
as follows:
B.2.1 Grouping tags
We provide an example of customized tag-group mem-
berships in Figure 6.
• In this task, you will receive a spreadsheet contain-
ing groups, and information tags included in those
groups. Note that the tags may include not only the
tags you defined in the initial interview, but also tags
defined by other users.
• We have grouped tags that seem to be dealing with
data of similar secrecy value. For instance, all the
work-related tags such as “Work”, “WorkTravel”
are in the group “Work”.
• The task is to verify group memberships, such that
every tag belongs to the correct group as per your
understanding.
• You can move tags around, i.e., remove them from
one group, and add to another, but you cannot add,
remove, or rename the groups themselves.
• The spreadsheet will also include a comments col-
umn, if you want to make a comment about a spe-
cific group, although comments are not required.
• Finally, the spreadsheet will include descriptions for
some group names for reference.
B.2.2 Ordering Groups
• In this task, you will be given a set of partial order
relations among the groups described in the previ-
ous experiment. This set of relations is only a base-
line.
• A relation between groups A and B, such that A;B,
means that B is more important than A. Since our
policies are information secrecy-related, more im-
portant may be understood as more sensitive.
• Your task is to modify (i.e., add or remove) the
given list of relations, i.e., to customize the orders
according to the your data secrecy/privacy prefer-
ences.
• You will also be allowed to use your initial group
assignment for reference.
• It is possible that the ordering of groups may be
different for different policies. Therefore, you will
be able to use different sets of relations for differ-
ent policies (total 7 policies). Please indicate if you
want to use the same order for all policies, or if you
would prefer to use different orders. This choice can
be made or modified at any point of time throughout
this task.
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Figure 6: Screenshot of the tag groups customized by P1
Figure 7: Screenshot of P1’s ordering of tag groups.
• In the end, I will confirm each order, for each policy
(if the user chooses to have different orders for dif-
ferent policies). For instance, if the user enters A;B,
I will confirm “is B more important than A?”.
• Finally, you have the option of continuing to the
next experiment after a break of 5-10 minutes, or
calling it a day.
B.3 Review of Examples
The review phase consisted of two tasks, namely a man-
ual review, and a semi-automated review using active
learning. This section provides the scripts for both tasks.
B.3.1 Manual Review
• In this task, you will receive a set of spreadsheets
(one per policy) containing your examples (i.e., the
context label + policy decision) for that policy.
• This is an opportunity for you to review your exam-
ples, and modify the policy decision if necessary.
The context labels cannot be modified.
• For each change you make, you will then indicate
the cause of the change in the respective column of
one of the following hints:
– “I have changed my mind”: i.e., my policy
preferences have changed.
– “It seems I made an error before”
– “I dont understand this policy example”: This
could happen if you do not remember why you
specified the policy, or are having trouble ex-
pressing it with tags you provided/used.
• Finally, for each change you make, please provide
justification in the last column. This column may
also be used for reasons other than the said hints.
• The investigator will go through the changes, and
may ask you to provide any missing justifications
or causes.
B.3.2 Semi-automatic Review
• In this task, our algorithm will suggest policy deci-
sions for existing context labels that you have pre-
viously provided.
• You must either agree (y) or disagree (n) to the de-
cision. You can also skip by entering n twice.
• For every decision that you disagree to, please pro-
vide a short justification.
• For example, the algorithm may suggest Denial of
export to the WorkCloud when the data object with
the context created at Home, Photo. This sugges-
tion will be presented as follows: Home+Photos,
WorkCloud = DENY (y/n)?
• If you agree, the algorithm will make another sug-
gestion, or stop.
• If you disagree, the algorithm will provide a text
input for the justification.
• The task will consist of at most 15 questions.
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Table 8: Number of unique example scenarios created by
each user, as well as the total number of policy examples
created after assigning decisions for 5 policies.
Users Example scenarios created Policy examples
(n) for 5 policies (n∗5)
P1 52 260
P2 23 115
P3 25 125
P4 24 120
P5 33 165
P6 26 130
P7 21 105
P8 42 210
Total 246 1,230
B.4 Testing with Random Examples
In this section, we describe the script for the phase of
testing with random examples. This phase was split into
two tasks as well, i.e., the task of labeling samples, and
of the post test review.
B.4.1 Labeling Test Samples
• In this task, you will receive a set of spreadsheets
(one per policy) containing examples (i.e., the con-
text).
• Your task is to label the policy decision (allow/-
deny/I dont know) for each example.
B.4.2 Post-test Review
• In this task, our algorithm will ask you to confirm
policy decisions that you have previously provided.
• Please agree (y) or disagree (n) with your decision.
• For every decision that you agree to, please provide
a short justification.
C Datasets
The number of examples per participant in the specifi-
cation and testing datasets are shown in Tables 8 and 9
respectively.
D Detailed split of causes of errors
A detailed split of the causes of error, across users and
policies, can be seen in Table 10.
Table 9: Number of random policy scenarios created for
testing predictions per participant. Participants provide
policy decisions (and PyBE predicts) for 5 policies.
Users Random Test Scenarios Labeled Test examples
(n) for 5 policies (n∗5)
P1 26 130
P2 11 55
P3 12 60
P4 12 60
P5 16 80
P6 14 70
P7 10 50
P8 21 105
Total 122 610
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Table 10: Breakdown of incorrect predictions into misconfigured weights (W), policy change (C), unconfirmed policy
change (U) and label confusion (L), across all participants and policies.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Policy W C U L W C U L W C U L W C U L W C U L W C U L W C U L W C U L
WorkCloud 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 2 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 3 1
PersonalCloud 6 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 7 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 0 1 3
WorkEmailApp 1 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0
PersonalEmailApp 6 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 4 1 0 1 7 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 1 1 1
SocialApp 4 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
Total 18 1 0 0 10 3 5 3 3 1 5 0 11 0 0 0 19 1 0 4 14 3 0 0 0 13 0 0 4 8 5 5
∗Five incorrect predictions for P8 (i.e., 3 in PersonalEmailApp and 2 in WorkEmailApp) are not included in the table due to insufficient
information.
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